ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The number of independent objectives policymakers can achieve is less than or equal to the number of independent policy levers at their disposal.
Because a central bank only has one policy lever--the quantity of reserves it supplies to the banking system--this constraint implies that it can (and should) pursue only one long run objective.
Moreover, both economic theory and abundant empirical evidence suggest that, if a central bank is to choose the goal it is most likely to achieve, a goal based on the behavior of the aggregate price level is most appropriate. The J-test is conducted simply by estimating
where g is the vector of predicted y under the alternative hypothesis. Dwyer and Hafer (1988) , who present evidence for a variety of countries that shows a close, one-to-one correspondence between the rate of money growth and the inflation rate.
2. See, among others, Neal (1991) and Hoskins (1991) . It also has been argued in some contexts (e.g. Garfinkel (1991)) that reserve requirements may offer a second policy lever for the Fed. This possibility is not considered here.
3. This is not to say that an intermediate target strategy is viewed by everyone as the best set of procedures for a central bank to follow. See, for example, McCallum (1985) for a summary of criticisms and responses to those criticisms.
4. Another example of a variable in this class is the commercial paperTreasury bill rate spread which Bernanke (1990) and Friedman and Kuttner (1992) have found to be closely linked to economic activity; it has not been argued, however, that the Fed can control the behavior of this spread.
For a comprehensive overview of intermediate targets for, and indicators of, monetary policy actions, their history in the United States and rationales for adopting or rejecting a particular target or indicator variable at a moment in time, see Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1990). (1989) has argued, advocates of the Quantity Theory of Money have had substantial disagreements over time about the appropriate definition of "money" for empirical exercises.
Indeed, as Laidler
For example, within the past few years alone, authors have found evidence in favor of Divisia M1A (Belongia and Chalfant (1989) ), simple sum M1A (Darby, et al. (1989) ), 512 (Hallman, Porter and Small (1991), and Hafer and Jansen (1991) ) and the currency equivalent (CE) aggregate of Rotemberg et al. (1991) .
6. See, e.g., Johannes and Rasche (1987) for a discussion of the base and money stock control.
7. The argument depends on the existence and size of a negative covariance between the control error and projection error; see their footnote 13, pp. 5-6. Also note the special case of the adjusted monetary base in this study:
Although it is taken to be the Fed's instrument of control, other empirical evidence, (Boschen and Talbot (1991) ), showing a close relationship with movements in the price level, also suggests it as an intermediate target.
Thus, if it is dominated by another target variable, which is subject to some control error, it must be that the basic relationship with the price level has errors larger than the other variable's joint error or that the other variable produces a negative covariance between its control and projection errors which is sufficiently large to offset the effects of the two sources of error considered independently.
8. Measuring the money stock as Divisia or Fisher Ideal index numbers--rather than equally weighted sums of dollars in various asset categories--was proposed in Barnett (1980) . Divisia weights are based on shares of expenditures on monetary services (Barnett (1978) ).
CE weights are calculated as:
R -r where R,. is a benchmark rate of return and nt is the return to the ith asset.
9. At another level, the Divisia and CE measures, which give smaller weights to individual assets as their own-rates of interest rise, are intended to mitigate these effects in broad measures such as M2. 10. See Greenspan (1992) .
11. The CE measure, as proved in Barnett (199lb) , also is the "true" Changing the assumption about expectations, however, also will affect the economic measure of the money stock.
12. Because the CE measures use 13-month centered moving averages of the interest rate spreads used as weights, it was thought that this smoothing might he responsible for an artificially good fit against a relatively smooth series such as inflation.
To investigate this possibility, unsmoothed series were constructed and compared but the qualitative results were unaffected.
This may be the result of aggregating further to quarterly averages of monthly data for use in the estimation. Results for ANB are from OLS estimations of the inflation equations above.
Null hypothesis for M is H 0 :~M = 1. The top entry in each cell is the t-statistic associated with the null hypothesis concerning the marginal information content of the row variable; the bottom entry applies to the marginal information of the column variable,
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